








A revised European Semester under centralised 





In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the EU entered 
a new phase of economic governance characterized by 
objectives, surveillance, and enforceability. This 
initiated an annual coordination cycle, called the 
European Semester, aimed at improving national 
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact and to 
curb macroeconomic imbalances. In its early years, the 
prevalence of fiscal discipline injunctions in the 
Semester had frequently crystallised tensions between 
its economic component and the Union's social 
aspirations, which were relegated to the status of 
macroeconomic indicators. To mitigate the erosion of 
the EU loss of legitimacy in this field, a new balance 
had to be struck. In this respect, the role of the 
European Commission (EC) has been of vital 
importance due to its extensive oversight authority over 
the coordination cycle. Asymmetries remain, but since 
the mid-2010s, economic performances and the EU 
social dimension have been increasingly acknowledged 
as the two sides of the same coin. These 
transformations have relied heavily on the activist role 
of social entrepreneurs in the EC, involvement of social 
affairs actors, and flexible governance processes. 
Following years of incremental changes, the fiscal rules 
and the European Semester were recently put on hold 
to respond to the challenges posed by the pandemic 
By adopting a €750 billion recovery plan, 
European leaders intend to avoid a repeat 
of the controversial management of the 
Eurozone crisis and the lack of public 
investment it engendered. The European 
Commission has set up a new coordination 
process to steer public investments and 
reforms foreseen by the national recovery 
plans, leaving the fully fledged European 
Semester aside for an indefinite period. In 
its current form, however, the management 
of the recovery package does not offer as 
many social guarantees as the former 
Semester did. To mitigate its weak social 
safeguards, the European Commission 
must strengthen the role of social affairs 
actors in its monitoring process. 
The present policy brief assesses past and 
present social developments in the 
framework of the European Semester, and 
the lessons to be learned from them. 
Although this paper focuses on the 
dynamics within the European 
Commission, it should be noted that similar 
tensions between social and economic 








outbreak. In parallel, the spirit of the Semester is still 
alive and well under the Recovery and Resilience 
Facility (RRF), the main instrument of the EU's €672.5 
billion recovery fund, as they are closely aligned in a 
number of major respects (i.e. challenges and priorities, 
the timing, upcoming assessments). 1  This new process 
has nevertheless reshuffled the balance of power 
between economic and social affairs actors in the EU 
economic governance. In its current form, the 
programming of the RRF runs the risk of overlooking 
social policy by neglecting social safeguards and 
sidelining actors in charge of social affairs.  
THE BARROSO II COMMISSION AND SOCIAL 
EUROPE AS A MARKET-MAKING PROJECT 
Under the Barroso II Commission, Social Europe was 
systematically downgraded as a market-making 
project.2 Budgetary concerns took precedence at that 
time while social Country Specific Recommendations 
(CSRs), ranging from pensions reforms and activation 
policies to wage moderation, were subordinated to the 
imperatives of economic competitiveness and fiscal 
discipline.3 The EC and the Council exerted 
considerable influence on how Member States should 
frame their structural reforms, which constituted an 
ongoing source of tensions, in particular among 
conservative-corporatist welfare states. In Belgium, for 
instance, the 2011 recommendation on reforming 
automatic wage indexation sparked a fierce outrage 
from the Prime Minister who called for the due respect 
of Belgian sovereignty. 4 
President Barroso did not share the same expansive 
vision for social policy as his Commissioner for 
Employment and Social Affairs, László Andor. For 
Andor, social policy must become a market-correcting 
project, which means it could generate market-
distorting effects if it aims at the greater good of a more 
inclusive society.5 Despite his marginalization on 
economic governance within the College of 
Commissioners, Andor triggered an initial phase of 
socialization of the Semester by increasing social affairs 
actors’ involvement. 6  At that time, DG ECFIN and 
the ECOFIN Council steered the Semester based on 
the respect of sound fiscal discipline, labour market 
deregulation and welfare retrenchment. An initial 
concession obtained by the Commissioner for Social 
Affairs was his ability to bring back the Social 
Protection Committee, an advisory body of the 
EPSCO Council formation, into the reviewing process 
of the CSRs and the National Reform Programmes as 
of 2013. 7 Above all, he reconfigured DG EMPL as a 
counterweight to the strategic relationship existing 
between the EC’s Secretariat-General (SEC-GEN) 
and DG ECFIN. Under the impulsion of 
Commissioner Andor, DG EMPL country teams 
started overseeing the initial drafting of social CSRs. 
These Units strove for a narrative in which the 
reduction of poverty and social exclusion would be 
perceived as ‘cost neutral’, an important breakthrough 
in rebalancing the role of the state and the market in the 
framework of the European Semester. 
JUNCKER AND THE SOCIAL ‘TRIPLE A’ FOR 
EUROPE 
The Juncker Commission held different cultural views 
on the notion of sound fiscal policy than its 
predecessor. Pierre Moscovici, then Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary affairs, moved away from the 
rigidity previously imposed on fiscal rules compliance: 
deviations were allowed as long as Member States 
undertook structural reforms. 8 This occurred in parallel 
with a long and iterative process of flexibilization of the 
fiscal framework, which recently culminated with the 
activation of the General Escape Clause in the 
aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis. The year 2015 
marked a turning point with a new working method 
under the auspices of the Juncker Commission which 
intended to be less intrusive than its predecessor in all 
matters and revamped the European Semester 
accordingly. Gradual socialization of the Semester took 
place as social objectives and actors became more 
prominent in the drafting and reviewing of the CSRs.  
The socialization of the European Semester remained 
mainly the consequence of a centralisation of power in 
the hands of the EC’s president and his entrepreneurial 








Juncker devoted much effort to the proclamation and 
the promotion of the European Pillar of Social Rights 
(EPSRs), a single conceptual framework that gathers 20 
principles under three areas, and which is transposed 
either to legislation or through policy coordination. 
This gave a clear new direction to the EU social policy 
by trading governance of convergence and 
harmonization, or inputs, for the promotion of a rights-
based approach to social policy.10 
Juncker made explicit use of his Cabinet and the SEC-
GEN to mainstream his social activism in the 
European Semester. He attached great importance to 
developing the autonomy of DG EMPL beyond the 
influence of DG ECFIN by giving the final say to the 
former in any dispute around the drafting of 
employment-related CSRs. Similarly, he transferred the 
‘Labour Market Policy’ and ‘Training and Skills’ Units, 
respectively from DG ECFIN and DG EAC, to DG 
EMPL. However, the most ground-breaking 
innovation of the Juncker Commission in the Semester 
was the introduction of a new monitoring tool, the 
Social Scoreboard, which featured 35 indicators that 
“screen employment and social performances of 
participating Member States”. 11 These indicators were 
aimed at steering national reforms and public 
investments. In practical terms, the Social Scoreboard 
gave leverage to DG EMPL to claim more social 
considerations in the CSRs and reallocated the tasks 
between DG EMPL and DG ECFIN. Although 
asymmetries still exist between the ‘social’ and the 
‘economic’ component of the Semester, the Juncker 
Commission left a strong footprint by giving more 
visibility for social and employment issues. 
THE VDL COMMISSION : REDISCOVERING 
THE VIRTUES OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
The Von der Leyen Commission fully embraced the 
EPSRs as a truly programmatic document and marked 
a paradigm shift in EU social policy by announcing a 
series of far-reaching initiatives. 12 This includes the 
EPSRs Action Plan but, more importantly, the 
initiative on adequate minimum wages which truly 
reflects a willingness to develop a socially regulated 
capitalism in the EU.13 In the meantime, the COVID-
19 outbreak and the efforts to mitigate its 
consequences heavily disrupted the socioeconomic 
agenda of the newly appointed Commission. The EU’s 
€ 672.5 billion COVID-19 Recovery and Resilience 
Facility led to significant transformations. From a fiscal 
and economic standpoint, it stands in stark contrast to 
the controversial austerity programmes that followed 
the EU sovereign debt crisis as boosting public 
investments is no longer contested. In institutional 
terms, the European Semester country reports and 
non-budgetary CSRs were suspended for the year 2021 
and it is uncertain whether it will ever return to its 
previous form. The reforms it used to trigger are 
currently steered by the RRF through the 
implementation of national Recovery and Resilience 
Programmes (RRPs). 
The governance of the RRF has been intrinsically 
aligned with the European Semester process, mainly 
since National Reform Programmes under the 
Semester and national Recovery and Resilience 
Programmes are now submitted within a single 
document. This is a mutually beneficial relation on 
paper. On the one hand, the Semester serves as a 
common framework for RRPs as they must reflect 
country-specific challenges identified in the 2019 and 
2020 CSRs. The RRF, on the other hand, provides 
financial incentive for the implementation of the CSRs. 
Thus, importantly, the recovery package could 
compensate the former lack of carrots under the 
Semester and, eventually, provide a systemic approach 
between investments and structural reforms. It can be 
expected that the political focus will remain on the 
achievement of an effective implementation of the 
RRPs over the next three years, as disbursements are 
expected to be made until the end of 2023. 14 
HAVE SOCIAL AFFAIRS ACTORS BEEN 
SIDELINED? 
Although the Council has the final say on its approval 
and payments, the RRF is under the direct 
management of the EC, which retains control over the 








monitors them. 15 Needless to say, new responsibilities 
urged for an overhaul of the EC bureaucratic structure. 
Hence, the Recovery and Resilience Task Force 
(RECOVER) was established in August 2020 to 
oversee the coordination and implementation of the 
RRF. Its mandate also includes the supervision of the 
European Semester. 
At the top of this new centralised management, 
RECOVER directly reports to the EC’s president 
through a steering board that aims at providing political 
guidance. It is chaired by President Von der Leyen and 
composed of the three executive vice-presidents and 
the Commissioner for Economy, Paolo Gentiloni. A 
first striking observation is the non-participation of 
Commissioner Nicolas Schmit, which might be 
detrimental to the balance between the economic and 
social portfolio. The promotion of social rights is thus 
carried by executive vice-president Valdis 
Dombrovskis in his role of coordinator of all work 
related to the economy and financial affairs. The wide-
ranging nature of his portfolio tends to minimize social 
rights and social investments as secondary objectives. 
For many, a guarantee of last resort appears in the 
figure of President Von der Leyen herself. Appointed 
German minister of family affairs between 2005-2009, 
then German minister of labour and social affairs 
(2009-2013), Ursula von der Leyen illustrated herself as 
the social conscience of the CDU over the first and the 
second Merkel cabinets. 16 
This new architecture runs the risk of calling into 
question the previously secured role of social affairs 
actors in the Semester configuration. In the 
programming of the RRF, DG EMPL was asked to 
provide recommendations for reforms and 
investments, but it no longer has the final say on their 
formulation. DG EMPL's country teams providing 
technical support for the evaluation of RRPs can 
nevertheless rely on its staff expertise, as they have 
acquired solid experience by monitoring Member 
States policy reforms for years. But once compared 
with the Semester, DG EMPL's influence is back to 
square one with a role largely limited to the RRPs 
consultation process, just like many other EC services. 
Furthermore, civil society actors and social partners 
were involved in a very diverse and unequal fashion 
across the different member states.17 The problem is 
likely to persist throughout the ongoing implementation of 
the national plans. 
This is a blow for stakeholders from the social affairs 
field (trade unions, civil society organizations, social 
affairs services of the EC) that have worked hard to 
encourage the EU to make the Semester ‘more social’ 
over the last decade, despite moderate success.18 
Nevertheless, this should hardly come as a surprise 
given the absence of binding social objectives in the EU 
recovery plan. While the guiding text around the RRF 
does actively support reforms related to the twin 
transition (national authorities must reach the 
minimum expenditure benchmarks of respectively 
37% to the green transition and 20% to the digital 
economy), it strictly refers to the EU Social Pillar as a 
compass and does not provide any safeguards or 
targets that would ensure a certain number of reforms 
and funds dedicated to social investments. A fact that 
has been widely criticized in the European Parliament. 
So far, the RRF process has strictly reinforced the role 
of EC services with clear targets, namely DGs in charge 
of the green transition and the digital economy. When 
it comes to pursuing social objectives, the RRF 
regulation only foresees a single flagship: ‘Reskill and 
upskill’. This translates the too strong emphasis on the 
supply-side approach of social policy. As argued by 
Laura Rayner: “social investment must be about more 
than just employment” 19. 
CONCLUSION 
The debate on the reform of the fiscal rules and the 
European Semester should resume in 2022, the year 
before the supposed deactivation of the General 
Escape Clause. The contours of the future EU 
economic governance remain a grey area as it is unclear 
whether the Semester and the RRPs will operate as two 
separate entities or will be part of a single 
comprehensive agenda. In any case, the return of the 
Stability and Growth Pact risks aggravating the current 








this background, it appears necessary to ensure that, 
whatever form this governance takes, the budgetary, 
economic and social balances achieved under the 
Juncker Commission are preserved. There is no fair 
recovery or twin transition as long as social 
stakeholders are not able to establish safeguards on the 
deep implications these transformations will have on 
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